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Abstract  
This  paper  uses  Paul  Ricœur’s  analyses  of  ideology  to  argue  for  the  mitigation  of  the  possibility  of  political  
evil   within   the   political   paradox.   In   explicating   the   paradox,   Ricœur   seeks   to   hold   in   tension   two   basic  
aspects   of  politics:   its   benefits   and   its  propensity   to   evil.   This   tension,  however,   should  not  be  viewed  as  
representative  of  a  dualism.  The  evil  of  politics  notwithstanding,  Ricœur  encourages  us  to  view  the  political  
order   as   a   deeply   important   part   of   our   shared   existence.   By   thinking   past   the   distorting   function   of  
ideology  to  the  legitimating  and  integrating  functions  that  Ricœur  calls  more  basic  than  distortion,  a  mode  
of  thought  that  is  often  at  the  heart  of  political  evil,  ideology  can  be  used  to  mitigate  that  very  evil.  
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Résumé 
Cet  article  s’appuie  sur   les  analyses  ricœuriennes  de  l’idéologie  dans  le  but  de  montrer  que  l’idéologie  est  
susceptible   de   contribuer   à   une   atténuation   du   mal   politique   inhérent   au   paradoxe   politique.   Dans   son  
explicitation  de  ce  paradoxe,  Ricœur  cherche  à  mettre  en  relation  tensionnelle  deux  aspects  fondamentaux  
de  la  politique:  ses  avantages  et  ses  maux.  Cependant,  cette  tension  ne  devrait  pas  être  interprétée  comme  
l’expression  d’un  dualisme.  En  dépit  du  mal   inhérent   au  politique,  Ricœur  nous  encourage  à  voir   l’ordre  
politique  comme  une  partie  profondément  importante  de  notre  existence  partagée.  Si  l’on  régresse  en-­‐‑deçà  
de  la  fonction  de  distorsion  de  l’idéologie  vers  ses  fonctions  légitimantes  et  integratrices,  c’est-­‐‑à-­‐‑dire  vers  ses  
fonctions  les  plus  fondamentales,  il  apparaît  en  effet  que  l’idéologie,  tout  en  étant  souvent  au  cœur  du  mal  
politique,  peut  néanmoins  être  utilisée  pour  atténuer  ce  mal.  
Mots-­‐‑clés:  Ricœur,  paradoxe  politique,  ideologie,  violence  politique,  justice.  
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Introduction  
When  writing  “The  Political  Paradox”  in  the  mid-­‐‑1950s,  the  persistence  of  the  State  as  a  
historical  actor  seemed  to  Paul  Ricœur  to  be  a  foregone  conclusion.   In  today’s  global  world  the  
perennial  nature  of  the  State  cannot  be  taken  for  granted.  And  yet  the  presence  of  the  State  and  its  
actions   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   its   own   citizens   and   the   international   community   remain   a   very   real   part   of  
contemporary  political   life.  The  oppressive  and  violent  nature  of   the  State   is  one  of   the   leading  
concerns  on  this  front.  And  it  was  a  leading  concern  of  Ricœur  who,  in  “The  Political  Paradox”  
attempts  to  grapple  with  the  simple  fact  of  the  State  and  its  tendency  to  political  evil,  a  specific  
kind   of   violence.   Simply   put,   the   paradox   holds   in   tension   the   benefit   and   risk   of   politics,   the  
good  and  evil  of  political  organization.  Ricœur  maintains  that  these  two  aspects  of  reality  cannot  
be  overcome,  one  simply  cannot  be  subsumed  by  the  other;  it  is,  ultimately,  impossible  to  resolve  
the   political   paradox.   I   intend   to   show   that   by   using   his   analysis   of   ideology   to   understand  
politics  it  is  possible  to  mitigate  the  threat  of  political  evil.  
This  essay  will  outline  the  political  paradox  that  Ricœur  develops  in  his  essay  of  the  same  
name.   Particular   attention  will   be   paid   to   the   distinction   between   the   originary   polity   and   the  
subsequent   possibility   of   political   alienation.   In   order   to   illuminate   the   concept   of   political  
alienation  I  propose  a  close  reading  of  parts  of  Ricœur’s  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia,  where  the  
imaginative   force   of   ideology   in   particular  will   prove   to   be   central   to   addressing   the   political  
paradox.  These   lectures  will   thus   form  the  basis   for   reading  back   into   the  political  paradox   the  
possibility  of  its  amelioration.  By  viewing  ideology  in  its  positive  mode,  as  proposed  by  Ricœur  
in  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia,  the  negative  aspect  of  the  political  paradox  that  he  identifies  can  
be  mitigated.  The  paradox  cannot  be  resolved;  the  possibility  of  political  evil  remains.  However,  
consistent  with   Ricœur’s   own   strategy,   through   recourse   to   the   integrative   stage   of   ideology   I  
seek  to  provide  an  alternative  to  the  crippling  effect  of  the  inevitability  of  political  evil  expressed  
by  the  political  paradox.    
By  reading  the  political  paradox  through  the  lens  of  a  positively  conceived  ideology,  the  
State  will   appear   in   its   rightful   place   as   an   aid   to   the   fulfillment   of   human  good.     Against   the  
often   unbridled   growth   of   government   power   and   the   egregious   offences   that   governments  
around   the   world   perpetrate   against   the   governed   it   is   tempting   to   think   that   the   exercise   of  
political  power  is  simply  evil.  But  to  call  all  politics  evil  is  to  ignore  the  degree  to  which  Ricœur  
views  political  power  as  legitimately  and  even  vitally  exercised.  To  reject  politics  as  merely  evil  
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The  Political  Paradox  
For  Paul  Ricœur,  the  political  sphere  is  home  to  a  troubling  paradox.  On  the  one  hand,  it  
unites  and  organizes  people  according  to  similar  values  and  for  the  pursuit  of  similar  goods,  thus  
contributing  to  the  equality  of  citizens  and  their  abilities  to  flourish.  On  the  other  hand,  the  very  
act   of   organizing   politically   entails   the   installation   of   an   authority   and   the   inauguration   of  
practices  of  power  that  are  fundamentally  alienating,  that  do  violence  to  citizens.  As  Ricœur  puts  
it,   the  paradox  is  “that  the  greatest  evil  adheres  to  the  greatest  rationality,   that   there   is  political  
alienation  because  polity  is  relatively  autonomous.”1  Evil  inheres  in  the  very  ends  and  means  of  
political  organization,  which  is  the  very  necessity  of  human  social  existence.  The  inescapability  of  
this  potential   for  evil  gives  exigency   to   the  paradox.  That   the  paradox  Ricœur   is   referring   to   is  
political  is  emphasized  by  the  causal  relation  indicated  in  the  latter  half  of  this  quotation,  which  
should  not  be   taken   to  mean   that   there   is  alienation  because   there   is  autonomy,  but  rather   that  
there  is  specifically  political  alienation  because  polity  is  relatively  autonomous,  meaning  that  it  is  
irreducible   to   other   categories,   notably   socio-­‐‑economics.   The   paradox   is   a   political   paradox  
because   it   addresses   itself   specifically   to   the   political   sphere,   and   the   evil   to  which   it   refers   is  
specifically  political  evil  because  it  is  different  in  kind  from  other  human  evils.  
While   Ricœur   is   at   pains   to   demonstrate   that   there   is   a   political   paradox,   the   central  
problem  is  not  that  there  is  a  paradox,  but  that  there  is  evil.  Evil  indicates  suffering  that  is  unjust.  
The  identification  of  a  specifically  political  paradox  is  instrumental  to  identifying  the  exercises  of  
power   that  usher   in  political  evil  with   the  purpose  of  eradicating  or  more   likely  mitigating   the  
effects  of  such  actions  or  practices.  Ricœur  demonstrates  a  methodology  for  exactly  this  when  he  
outlines  a  critique  of  power   in  a  socialist   state   in   the   third  part  of  “The  Political  Paradox.”  The  
present  essay  takes  a  different  approach  to  the  same  problem,  an  engagement  with  the  positive  
aspects  of  ideology.  
In  the  evil  at  the  heart  of  the  political  paradox  is  a  specific  kind  of  alienation.  Reference  to  
this   alienation   raises   at   least   two   questions.   The   first   question:   From   what   is   one   politically  
alienated?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  relatively  simple  insofar  as  Ricœur’s  argument  depends  
on   an   important   distinction   between   the   political,   or   polity,   and  politics.   The   second   question:  
What  is  the  nature  of  political  alienation?  While  Ricœur  engages  Marx’s  critique  extensively,  he  is  
least  clear  on  the   issue  of  alienation,  at   least  as  he  addresses   it   in  “Political  Paradox.”  But  there  
are  important  clues  to  what  alienation  looks  like,  and  there  are  certainly  passages  in  other  texts  
that   provide   details   that   should   not   be   overlooked.   I   will   address   the   “what”   of   political  
alienation  after  first  having  considered  the  “from  what”  of  alienation.    
From  what  are  individuals  politically  alienated?  The  short  answer  is  polity.  Consider  the  
following   claim   as   regards   the   polity:   “equality   before   the   law,   and   the   ideal   equality   of   each  
before  all,  is  the  truth  of  polity.  This  is  what  constitutes  the  reality  of  the  State...As  soon  as  there  is  
a  State,  a  body  politic,  the  organization  of  an  historical  community,  there  exists  the  reality  of  this  
ideality.”2   Historical   reality   does   not   yet   refer   to   the   sphere   of   power,   or   if   the   temporal  
implications  of  “not  yet”  are  problematic,  then  at  least  historical  reality  does  not  only  refer  to  the  
sphere   of   power   and   its   exercise.   The   historical   presence   of   the   State   is,   for   Ricœur,   the  
actualization  in  history  of  the  idea  of  the  equality  of  persons.  Irrespective  of  the  historical  fact  of  
the  domination  of  persons  by  others,  the  State  is  not  predicated  on  domination.  The  importance  
of  this  cannot  be  overstated.  It  marks  the  hope  that  I  share  with  Ricœur  that  political  violence  can  
be  mitigated  by  human  action  and  intervention.  
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The   interplay  of   the   ideal  and  the  real   in  Ricœur’s  conception  of   the  State   is  part  of  his  
larger   reflection   on   the   idea   of   the   social   contract,   drawn   from  Rousseau.   Ricœur   is   under   no  
illusion  regarding  the  fictional  nature  of  the  social  contract,  which  he  refers  to  as  a  “ready-­‐‑made  
fiction.”3  The  pact  stands  outside  of  history  and  is  thus  operative  always  as  an  ideal  concept.  But  
importantly,   this   ideal   has   a   hermeneutic   function.   The   fictional   nature   of   the   social   contract  
indicates  that  the  contract  represents  an  originary  moment  that  by  its  very  nature  always  lies  in  
the  past.  It  is  not  something  that  will  have  been;  it  is  something  that  has  been.  Thus,  Ricœur  notes  
that  it  is  only  in  retrospection  that,  “polity  takes  on  meaning.”4  Polity  is  about  the  formation  of  a  
narrative   through   which   a   given   community   understands   itself.   Through   this   hermeneutic  
function   the   virtual   act   founds   a   historical   community   to   which   is   given   the   title   polity,   and  
which  represents,  Ricœur  suggests,  the  telos  of  the  State  that  aligns  Rousseau  with  Aristotle.  “The  
pact  which  engenders  the  body  politic  is,”  Ricœur  writes,  “the  telos  of  the  State  referred  to  by  the  
Greeks.”5  The  comparison  is  made  clear  if  the  opening  lines  of  Aristotle’s  Politics  are  considered:  
“Since  we  see  that  every  city  is  some  sort  of  partnership,  and  that  every  partnership  is  constituted  
for  the  sake  of  some  good  (for  everyone  does  everything  for  the  sake  of  what  is  held  to  be  good),  
it   is   clear   that   all   partnerships   aim   at   some   good,   and   that   the   partnership   that   is   most  
authoritative   of   all   and   embraces   all   the   others   does   so   particularly,   and   aims   at   the   most  
authoritative  good  of  all.  This  is  what  is  called  the  city  of  the  political  partnership.”6    
Ricœur   sees   in   this   the   clear   alignment   of   the   political   sphere  with   the   human   end   of  
happiness.  This  does  not  mean  that  Ricœur  espouses  a  single  end  of  happiness  toward  which  all  
aim.  He   recognizes   the  various   and  varied  goods   to  which   individuals   aim,   identified  by   each  
independently   in   basic   reflection   on   a   good   life.   One   of   the   reasons   that   Ricœur   develops   his  
“little   ethic”   in  Oneself   as  Another   is   the   recognition  of   the  validity  of  various   individual  goods  
within   the   broader   context   of   a   common   good   towards   which   the   State   is   oriented.   Thus,   for  
Ricœur,  politics   is  meant   to   represent   the   enhancement  of   the   individual’s   capacity   to   seek   the  
good   and   a   mechanism   for   the   adjudication   of   conflicting   goods.   Against   this   background,  
“Politics,”   Ricœur   claims,   “discloses   its   meaning   only   if   its   aim…can   be   linked   up   with   the  
fundamental  intention  of  philosophy  itself,  with  the  Good  and  with  Happiness.”7  The  creation  of  
the   contract   is   a   response   to   goods   sought,  with   the   assumption   that  mutual   cooperation  will  
enhance   the  ability  of  members   to   the  contract   to  achieve   their  sought  after  goods.   In   this  way,  
polity   serves,   for   Ricœur,   as   a   positive   concept   for   the   realization   of   the   rights   of   each   to   the  
pursuit   of   the   good,   and   the   benefit   of   the   community   for   that   very   pursuit.   The   polity   is   a  
response  to  a  central  concern  of  human  existence,  the  possibility  of  good.      
If   the   goodness   of   human   life   together   indicates   the   pole   of   polity   in   the   paradox,   the  
shift  to  the  pole  of  political  evil  is  brought  about  in  the  reflection  on  power  within  politics.    The  
nature  of   the  distinction  between  these  poles   is  given  in  an  important  clarification,  made  in  the  
English   translation   of   “The   Political   Paradox”   that   appears   in   History   and   Truth.   Addressing  
himself   to   the   language   that   Ricœur   employs   throughout   the   text,   the   translator   notes,  
“throughout  this  essay,  particularly  in  the  second  section,  the  author  contrasts  polity  (le  politique)  
with  politics  (la  politique).  By  polity,  the  author  intends  the  ideal  sphere  of  political  organization  
and   historical   rationality;   by   politics,   the   empirical   and   concrete   manifestations   of   this   ideal  
sphere,   the   sum   total   of   the   means   employed   to   implement   the   ideal   sphere   of   polity.”8  
Sociologist  Oliver  Marchart   is   illuminating  on   this  distinction.  He   claims   that   the  distinction   is  
“between  an   ideal  sphere  of   the  political   (the  polity  embodying  rational  concord),  defined  by  a  
specific  rationality,  and  the  sphere  of  power  (politics).”9  By  highlighting  the  concept  of  power  as  
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key   aspect  motivating   violence   and   political   evil   that  will   provide   for  me   the   bridge   between  
“The  Political  Paradox”  and  Lectures   on   Ideology   and  Utopia.   It   is   exactly   the   struggle   for  power  
and   in  particular   the  exercise  of  power  over  others   that   signals   the  nature  of  political  evil  with  
which  Ricœur  is  concerned.  
It  is  “politics  defined  by  reference  to  power—which  poses  the  problem  of  political  evil.”10  
The   interpretive  movement   at   the   heart   of   polity   is   not   an   exercise   of   power.   This  means   that  
political  evil  is  not  present  at  the  advent  of  polity.  The  advent  of  the  political  does  not  bring  about  
political   evil.   It   is  only   in   the  working  out  of  polity  where  “politics   is  pursued  step  by   step,   in  
‘prospection,’  in  projects,  that  is  to  say  both  in  an  uncertain  deciphering  of  contemporary  events,  
and   in   the   steadfastness   of   resolutions,”11   that   political   evil   is   born.   This   is   not   to   say   that,  
according   to   Ricœur,   we   can   imagine   politics   without   violence,   without   alienation.   Rather,  
because   the   political   and   political   alienation   are   not   co-­‐‑originary   a   greater   possibility   for   the  
mitigation  of  political  evil  opens  up.  
By  arriving  at   the   fact  of  political  evil   this  way  an   important  point  can  be  noted.  While  
the  definition  of  politics  with  reference  to  power  opens  up  the  possibility  of  political  evil,  Ricœur  
is  clear  that  power  itself  does  not  entail  evil.  “There  is  a  problem  of  political  evil  because  there  is  
a  specific  problem  of  power.  Not  that  power  is  evil.  But  power  is  one  of  the  splendors  of  man  that  
is  eminently  prone  to  evil.”12  It  is  useful  here  to  note  the  distinction  that  Ricœur  will  make  later  in  
his   career   between   power-­‐‑in-­‐‑common   and   domination,   a   distinction   that   he   borrows   from  
Arendt.13  Simply  speaking,  power  is  the  capacity  to  act.  When  power  is  addressed  in  the  sphere  
of  the  political,  then  it  is  deemed  the  capability  for  common  action,  or  acting  together.  This  too  is  
borrowed  from  Arendt.14  The  presence  of  power  in  the  sphere  of  the  political  does  not  represent  
political   evil.   It   is   only   when   the   exercise   of   power   creates   asymmetry   in   the   relations   of  
members,  contrary  to  the  social  contract,   that  political  alienation  comes  into  view.  This   is  when  
politics  becomes  evil.  
While  Ricœur  names  a  specifically  political  evil,  and  while  it  is  clear  that  such  evil  refers  
to   political   alienation,   there   is   little   in   the  way   of   an   analysis   of   abstract   political   evil   in   “The  
Political   Paradox.”   Ricœur   discusses   instances   of   political   evil,   including   the   exhortations   of  
prophets   in  ancient   Israel,   the  execution  of   Jesus  as  a  political  act,  and   the   tyrant   that   is   tied   to  
lies,   flattery   and   untruth   in   Plato’s  writings.15   Each   of   these   examples   has   at   its   heart   violence  
against  others  made  possible  by   the   fact   that   there   are   some  who   rule  over  others.  What   these  
examples   demonstrate,   thus,   is   that   political   evil   is   attached   to   a   certain   expression   of   power-­‐‑
over.   The   corollary   to   Arendt’s   concept   of   power-­‐‑in-­‐‑common,   noted   above,   is   domination.  
Domination  is  alienation  par  excellence  in  that  it  takes  political  power,  originally  a  part  of  power-­‐‑
in-­‐‑common,  and  places  it  in  the  hands  of  one  or  a  few.16  At  the  heart  of  this  shift  is  the  concept  of  
authority,   with   the   question   of   legitimacy   ultimately   addressing   itself   to   the   emergence   of  
political  evil.  
The  difficulty  of  differentiating  between  the  exercise  of  power  and  its  abuse  can  be  seen  
in   Ricœur’s   discussion   of   Machiavelli.   Ricœur   rightly   notes   that,   “the   Prince   evinces   the  
implacable   logic   of   political   action:   the   logic   of   means,   the   pure   and   simple   techniques   of  
acquiring   and  preserving  power.”17   If   the   specific  problem  of  politics   is   the  problem  of  power,  
then   it   is   clearly   the   case   that   violence   and   alienation   are   intimately   linked   to   the   exercise   of  
power.   As   Ricœur   states   here,   politics   is   about   power.   But   earlier   in   the   essay   Ricœur,   in   a  
characteristically   hermeneutic   move,   invokes   Aristotle   and   asserts   that,   for   politics   to   be  
meaningful   its   aim  must  be   linked   to   a   conception  of   “the  Good  and  with  Happiness.”18  Now,  
while  this  assertion  appears  in  the  section  of  the  text  dedicated  to  polity,  Ricœur,  this  time,  uses  
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politics   (la   politique)   rather   than   polity   (le   politique).   Thus   he   is   referring   to   the   circumstantial  
nature  of  political  life  and  the  specificity  of  context  to  which  a  given  politics  must  respond.  Given  
Ricœur’s  constant  care  in  the  deployment  of  language  it  can  hardly  be  the  case  that  he  meant  to  
write  polity  (le  politique).  What  is  one  to  make  of  this  ambiguity?  There  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  
claim  that  politics  is  about  power,  that  the  machinations  of  politics  are  about  the  acquisition  and  
preservation   of   power.   The   focus   in   this   claim   is   on   the  means,   though   there   remains   a   telos,  
which   is   power   itself.   On   the   other   hand,   politics   is   about,   or   is   to   be   about   the   Good   and  
Happiness,  which  means   for  Ricœur   the  general  well-­‐‑being  of   citizens  with  presumed  equality  
and  a  limited  infringement  on  individual  opportunities  to  seek  a  personal  good-­‐‑life.  Here,  means  
are   not   identified   but   the   telos   remains   central   and   clear,   it   is   the   happiness   of   the   citizen(s).   I  
must  admit   to  an  uncertain  footing.  Certainly   the  aim  at  happiness   is  present   in   the   initial  pact  
that  establishes  polity.  There  can  be  little  doubt  about  this.  But  I  submit  that  the  aim  at  happiness  
remains   a   central   issue   in   the   analytical   move   from   polity   to   politics,   and   that   this   is   so   is  
important   for   the   hope   that   Ricœur   embeds   in   his   political   theory   and   the   possibility   for  
mitigating  the  threat  of  political  evil.  As   long  as  politics  remains  subservient  to  the  good  of   the  
people  —  and  this  can  only  be  determined  through  constant  dialogue  and  policy  refinement  —  
then   political   evil   is   kept   at   bay.   The   moment   people   become   the   servants   of   power   we   are  
confronted  with  political  evil.    
Having   located   the   source   of   political   evil   in   a   certain   kind   of   exercise   of   power   it  
remains   to   be   shown  what   political   alienation   looks   like   for   Ricœur.   Though  Ricœur   does   not  
provide   a   clear   description   of   political   alienation   in   “The  Political   Paradox,”   some   elements   of  
this   alienation   can   be   found   in   that   essay.   In   his   discussion   of   Marx’s   response   to   Hegel’s  
theorization   of   the   State   Ricœur   writes,   “the   essence   of   Marx’s   critique   lies   in   exposing   the  
illusion  in  this  pretension.  The  State  is  not  the  true  world  of  man  but  rather  another  and  unreal  
world;   it   resolves   real   contradictions   only   in   virtue   of   a   fictive   law   which   is,   in   turn,   in  
contradiction  with   the   real   relationships   between  men.”19   This   reading   of  Marx   is   particularly  
insightful   in   that   it   picks   up   on   the   symbolic   nature   of   the   State   and   its   organizing   elements.  
Whereas  Hegel  understood  the  State  to  be  an  accurate,  a  real  representation  of  humanity,  Marx  
criticizes  the  State  for  being  a  distorted  representative  of  human  relationships.  It  is  on  account  of  
this  distortion   that  Ricœur  will  ultimately   join  Marx   in  a  critique  of   ideology.   In   this   text,  “The  
Political   Paradox,”   Ricœur   does   not   yet   attach   significance   to   the   way   in   which   ideology   is  
functioning  here;   indeed   the   term  ideology  does  not  yet  appear.  Rather,  Ricœur  criticizes  Marx  
for   the   claim   that   all   alienation   is   based   on   wage   relations   and   is   thus   economic   alienation.  
Because,   in   contrast,   Ricœur   is   writing   about   political   alienation   he   can   point   to   the   actual  
experience   of   socialism   in   the   20th   century   as   evidence   against  Marx’s   idea   of   the   “withering  
away   of   the   State.”   The   socialist   state,   perhaps   more   than   any   other   system   of   governance,  
increased  remarkably  in  size  and  power  under  Marxist-­‐‑Leninist  influences.    
Insofar   as   Marx   views   the   State   as   distorting   human   relations   he   proves   useful   to  
Ricœur’s  argument  for  a  political  paradox.  The  challenge  to  political  thought  is  that,  
the  political   sphere   is  divided  between   the   ideal   of   sovereignty  and   the   reality  of  power,  
between   sovereignty   and   the   sovereign,   between   the   constitution   and   the  
government…This  is  of  the  essence  of  political  evil.  No  State  exists  without  a  government,  
an   administration,   a   police   force;   consequently,   the   phenomenon   of   political   alienation  
traverses  all  regimes  and  is  found  within  all  constitutional  forms.  Political  society  involves  
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communal   relations—and   this   internal   contradiction   between   sovereignty   and   the  
sovereign,  between  the  constitution  and  power  or,  in  the  extreme,  the  police.  We  aspire  to  
attain   a   State   wherein   the   radical   contradiction   which   exists   between   the   universality  
pursued  by  the  State  and  the  particularity  and  caprice  which  it  evinces  in  reality  would  be  
resolved.  The  evil  is  that  this  aspiration  is  not  within  our  reach.20    
The   distinction   between   an   external   contradiction   and   an   internal   contradiction   is  
illuminating.   Earlier,   I   argued   that   political   evil   must   not   be   viewed   as   co-­‐‑originary   with   the  
political   sphere,   that   it   was   important   to   hold   them   apart   philosophically   regardless   of   the  
historical   outworking   of   political   action.  Here,   in   commenting   on  Marx’s   critique   of   the   State,  
Ricœur  provides  a  clear  methodological  way  to  distinguish  between  the  nature  of  the  State  and  
its  propensity  to  violence,  to  evil.  It  is  in  the  internal  contradiction  that  evil  appears.  Prior  to  this,  
the  contradiction  between   the   ideal   sphere  and   the  real   sphere  of  community   is  marked  by   the  
problematic   of   a   dialectic   of   equality   and   authority.   There   is   not   yet   violence   or   evil.  Violence  
emerges  when  authority  is  attached  to  a  concrete  person  or  group  with  a  concomitant  shift  of  the  
priority   of   politics   from   a   telos   of   happiness   to   a   telos   of   power.   One   of   the   best   ways   to  
understand  this  shift  is  through  the  nuances  of  ideology  developed  by  Ricœur  in  his  Lectures  on  
Ideology  and  Utopia.  
Ideology  
The  preceding  analysis  of  “The  Political  Paradox”  is  in  need  of  some  assistance  if  it  is  to  
achieve  clarity.  The  formation  of  the  goals  of  good  and  happiness  corresponding  to  the  formation  
of  a  community  of  persons  with  shared   interests,   the  authorization  of   leadership  or   rulers,  and  
the   shift   from   the   goal   of   happiness   to   the   goal   of   power   are   three   areas   in   which   Ricœur’s  
reflections  on  ideology  are  revealing.  As  will  be  demonstrated,  ideology  is  in  fact  operative  in  all  
of   these   areas,   an   insight   that   opens   up   the   possibility   of   mitigating   the   second   part   of   the  
political  paradox,  the  inevitability  of  political  evil.  
Ricœur’s   most   sustained   analysis   of   ideology   appears   in   his   Lectures   on   Ideology   and  
Utopia.   In  this  text,  along  with  other  essays  on  the  topic,  Ricœur  engages  with  the  work  of  Karl  
Mannheim.  Ricœur  details  the  way  in  which  Mannheim  brings  ideology  and  utopia  together  on  
the   basis   of   their   sharing   the   characteristic   of   non-­‐‑congruence.   That   is,   they   both   signal   a  
discrepancy  with  reality.  One  of  Ricœur’s  arguments  is  that  this  discrepancy  is  in  fact  constitutive  
of  human  social  existence.21  The  social  imagination,  operative  in  both  ideology  and  utopia,  brings  
into  being   the  social  world.  The  centrality  of   imagination   is  highlighted   throughout   the   text  by  
virtue  of  the  dependence  of  all  forms  of  both  ideology  and  utopia  on  symbolic  structures.  And  it  
is  in  the  symbolic  nature  of  social  reality  that  ideology,  and  to  a  less  emphasized  degree  utopia,  
come   to   be   understood   as   fundamentally   interpretive   structures.   Within   the   interpretative  
framework   of   ideology   in   particular   Ricœur   demonstrates   the   way   in   which   legitimation   and  
integration  can  be  understood  as  hermeneutic  concepts.  
The   symbolic   nature   of   ideology   is   noted   at   the   outset.   “The   process   of   distortion   is  
grafted   onto   the   symbolic   function.  Only   because   the   structure   of   human   social   life   is   already  
symbolic   can   it   be   distorted.”22   This   claim   strips   away   the   most   common   understanding   of  
ideology,  that  of  distortion,  on  the  basis  that  ideology  is  grounded  in  something  more  primitive.  
In  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia  Ricœur  identifies  and  engages  in  a  regressive  analysis  of  three  
stages   of   ideology:   integration,   legitimation,   and   distortion.   As   Ricœur   notes,   by   deploying   a  
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material  and  economic  conception  of  a  ruling  class  and  ruling  ideas  Marx  demonstrates  a  break  
between   ideology   and   reality.   But  Ricœur’s   analysis   leads   him   to   interrogate   the   nature   of   the  
ruling   class   by   addressing   the   way   in   which   class   structure   distorts.  With   the   aid   of  Weber’s  
analysis  of  authority  Ricœur’s  analysis  leads  him  to  ideology  as  legitimation.  But  Ricœur  does  not  
stop  there.  The  ability  of  someone  or  some  group  to  claim  authority,   to  be  granted  authority,   is  
dependent  on  a  symbolic  field  of  shared  values  that  constitute  a  shared  identity.  This  is  ideology  
as  identity  or  integration.23    
It   is   exactly   ideology  as   integration,  and   to   some  extent   ideology  as   legitimation,   that   I  
want   to   focus   on.   Without   simply   ignoring   ideology   as   distorting,   it   is   in   Ricœur’s   novel  
interpretation   of   ideology   that   it  will   be   possible   to   find   resources   to  mitigate   the   threatening  
element  of  the  political  paradox.  
Let  us  start  with   ideology  as   integration.  Ricœur   is  well-­‐‑known  for  his  hermeneutics  of  
suspicion,   developed   around   the   masters   of   suspicion,   Marx,   Nietzsche,   and   Freud.   Those  
familiar   with   this   approach   will   not   find   it   surprising,   then,   that   in   discussing   ideology   as  
distortion,   linked   to   Marx,   Ricœur   argues   that   suspicion   is   the   appropriate   interpretive  
approach.24  However,  in  the  integrative  stage,  “the  main  attitude  is  not  at  all  suspicion  nor  even  
the  value-­‐‑free  but  conversation.”25  The  presence  of  values  and  their  full  acceptance  is  important  
at  this  stage  and  will  be  addressed.  But  first  it  should  be  noted  that  conversation  gestures  in  the  
first   instance  to   language,  and  thus  the  symbolic  structure  of  human  social   life.  Recall  Ricœur’s  
claim  in  the  book’s  introduction  that  practice,  and  also  ideology,  is  embedded  in  and  dependent  
on  an  existing  symbolic  structure.  Human  social  life  is  fundamentally  symbolic  and  the  elements  
that  organize  social  life  are  both  expressions  of  that  symbolism  and  dependent  on  it.  The  use  of  a  
system  of   symbols   already   reveals   a   shared   aspect   of   human   life   that   is   then   enhanced   by   the  
formation   of   additional   structures   designed   to   organize   that   shared   life,   such   as   social  
institutions.   It   is   here   that   the   seeds   of   ideology   as   integration   can   be   found.   It   becomes   full-­‐‑
blown   through   the   realization   of   socially   organizing   structures.   The   conversation   that   Ricœur  
highlights   occurs   within   a   symbolic   framework   that   is   intended   to   identify   further   common  
values,   values   that   are   widely   shared   and  meet   with   the   desire   for   historical   continuity.   This  
conversation  is  the  outworking,  the  discovery  of  a  shared  sense  of  meaning,  even  possibly  shared  
life  goals  that  give  the  members  of  a  community  a  shared  sense  of  identity.  Ideology  at  this  stage  
is  the  formation  of  a  shared  meaning  that  drives  or  will  drive  a  shared  narrative.26  And  insofar  as  
ideology   as   integration   is   tied   to   the   formation   of   a   shared   narrative   understanding   of  who   a  
people   is   and  where   they   come   from,   it   aligns  with   the   sustaining   and   stabilizing   functions   of  
social  institutions.27  Thus,  ideology  as  integration  is  also  preservative.  The  task  of  the  community,  
and  that  to  which  ideology  as  integration  responds,  is  relieving  the  strain  caused  by  the  threat  of  
lost  identity.28    
What   does   this   discussion   of   identity   formation   and   preservation   have   to   do  with   the  
political  paradox  discussed  above?  In  discussing  the  concept  of  polity,  which  forms  one  pole  of  
the  paradox,  Ricœur  addresses  at  considerable  length  the  fiction  of  a  social  contract,  in  particular  
as  it  is  developed  by  Rousseau.  Importantly,  the  social  contract  is  an  originary  event;  it  represents  
the  formation  of  a  community  of  at  least  minimally  shared  values  organizing  for  the  betterment  
of  all.  One  of  the  reasons  that  Ricœur  uses  Rousseau’s  vision  of  the  social  contract  is  the  way  in  
which  the  general  will  is  representative  of  the  general  interest  of  a  people  united  under  the  social  
contract.29  Not  only  do  people  form  a  political  community  for  protection  against  threat,  as  is  the  
case   for  Hobbes’s   conception  of   the  political,  but   they   form  a  community   for   the  good   that   the  
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limit  experiences  of  freedom,  the  act  of  contracting  also  makes  each  participant  in  the  contract  a  
part   of   something   else,   something   bigger   and   with   greater   promise;   with   the   social   contract  
emerges  the  citizen  who,  for  Ricœur  following  Aristotle,  has  the  potential  for  realizing  the  fullest  
humanity.31  A  new  identity  attaches  to  this  new  stage  of  human  interaction  in  the  State.  
That  the  form  of  the  State  represents  the   initial  stage  of   ideology  as   integration  is   fairly  
clear.   It   is  more   difficult   to   see   ideology   as   integration   operative   in   the   struggle   to  maintain   a  
community   identity,   though   this   is   exactly  what  Ricœur  has   in  mind   in  his   reading  of  Clifford  
Geertz   that   makes   up   lecture  15   of   his   Lectures   on   Ideology   and   Utopia.   Perhaps   the   clearest  
articulation  of  the  bridge  between  community  formation  and  the  preservation  of  its  identity,  with  
respect   to   ideology,   can   be   found   in   Ricœur’s   analysis   of   the   ideological   nature   of   the   social  
sciences.   In   “Ideology   and   Science”   he   identifies   five   characteristics   of   ideology:   it   diffuses   a  
founding   act,   is   both   dynamic   and   motivational,   thrives   on   simplicity   and   schematics,   rejects  
themes  in  favor  of  operation,  and  is  resistant  to  new  ideas  not  easily  assimilable  to  what  already  
exists.32  Ricœur  will  go  on  to  argue  in  this  text  that  ideology  as  distortion  only  appears  with  the  
final   characteristic;   ideology’s   resistance   to   the   new   employs   protective   strategies   that  
dissimulate   from   the   actual   state   of   things   that   is   inducing   change.   It   is   the   first   of   the   listed  
characteristics  that  is  immediately  useful  for  present  purposes.    
Ricœur  discusses  diffusion  of  the  founding  act  as  an  extension  of  the  imaginary  moment  
of   the   act   into   the   present.   “Ideology   is   a   function   of   the   distance   that   separates   the   social  
memory   from   an   inaugural   event   that   must   nevertheless   be   repeated.   Its   role   is   not   only   to  
diffuse   the   conviction   beyond   the   circle   of   founding   fathers,   so   as   to  make   it   the   creed   of   the  
entire  group,  but  also  to  perpetuate  the  initial  energy  behind  the  period  of  effervescence.”33  The  
repetition  or  replay  of  the  inaugurating  event,  presumably  in  the  celebration  of  national  holidays  
commemorating  the  founding  of  nations,  connects  citizens  to  those  who  went  before,  reinforcing  
some  form  of  shared  identity.  This  is  not  to  say  that  identity  remains  static.  Indeed,  the  event  is  
replayed  in  a  new  context  and  is  related  to  in  light  of  the  context,  it  is  both  old  and  new.    
Bernard   Dauenhauer   refers   to   the   exertion   of   ideology   in   the   establishment   and  
maintenance   of   identity   as   a   struggle   for   “narrative   control.”   Two   different   attempts   at   such  
control  are  exemplified  in  revolutionary  and  reactionary  politics,  both  of  which  are  responses  to  a  
tension   caused   by   a   disjunction   between   “historical   actuality   and   fictive   possibility.”34  
Dauenhauer  goes  on  to  write,  “reactionary  attempts  to  eliminate  this  tension  seek  to  constrict  the  
future  by  wholly  subjugating  it  to  the  past.  They  dogmatically  disdain  the  genuinely  new  and  the  
initiative  that  can  bring  it  about.  Conversely,  revolutionary  attempts  to  eliminate  this  tension  so  
favor   the  merely   dreamed-­‐‑for   that   they   dogmatically   dismiss   the   abiding   achievements   of   the  
predecessors.”35  The  necessity  for  both  truth  and  imagination  in  politics  that  Dauenhauer  is  here  
advocating,   in   his   reading   of   Ricœur’s   political   thought,   gestures   towards   an   important  
hermeneutic   element.   Ideology   is   a   reading   of   the   world   that   seeks   to   contribute   meaning   to  
disparate   or   discordant   elements.   Much   like   the   emplotment   of   life   events   into   a   narrative  
identity,   discussed   by  Ricœur   in   depth   in  Oneself   as  Another,   ideology   provides   identity   to   the  
community.      
While  the  struggle  for  narrative  control  refers  to  ideology  as  integration,  it  also  indicates  
ideology  as  legitimation  or  justification.  This  move  is  indicated  by  an  intensification  of  language  
that  was  noted  to  be  at  the  heart  of  concerns  about  ideology.  In  fact,  the  language  of  revolution  
and   strong-­‐‑arm   reaction   demonstrates   an   intensification   that   already   signals   the   possibility   of  
distortion.  Furthermore,  by  demonstrating  political  decision  and  action,  reaction  and  revolution  
bring  into  play  the  concept  of  power  that  is  at  the  heart  of  the  political  paradox,  as  noted  above.  
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In  attempting  to  resolve  tension  and  produce  stability,  these  responses  enact  violence.  However,  
the  giving  or  taking  of  authority  to  control  the  narrative  of  a  community  represents  ideology  as  
legitimation  and  thus  requires  careful  consideration  of  this  intermediary  form.    
If   the   political   community   begins   with   a   polity   based   on   equality,   establishing  
sovereignty  of  a  people,  it  is  the  selection  and  authorization  of  a  sovereign  that  is  the  initial  move  
of  political   alienation.  Note   that  Rousseau  would  have   each  and  every  member  of   the  political  
community  have  a  say  in  deciding  legislation,  eschewing  political  representation.36  Among  other  
things,   this   is  because  without  actual  participation  of  every  member   the  general  will   cannot  be  
determined,  and  thus  the  common  good  to  which  the  community  is  oriented  is  in  danger.  Ricœur  
does  not   support  Rousseau   in   this   extreme   form  of  direct   government,   but  he   is  deeply   aware  
that  the  installation  of  a  sovereign  has  important  implications  for  political  equality.  Thus  it  is  that  
at  the  level  of  legitimation  one  finds  the  seeds  of  political  evil  in  the  violence  perpetrated  through  
the  appeal  to  ideology.  
Ideology  as  legitimation  operates  on  the  basis  of  a  claim  and  belief  in  that  claim.  Ricœur  
suggests  that  the  claim  to  political  authority  is  by  its  very  nature  dependent  on  a  surplus-­‐‑value.  
This  is  not  surprising  given  the  initial  equality  of  the  social  contract  that  rejects  a  differentiation  
of  valuation  between  members.  But  it  means  that  there  is  what  Ricœur  refers  to  as  a  gap  between  
the  claim  to  authority  and   the  belief   in   that  claim.   It   is   in   this  gap,   in   response   to   the  disparity  
between   claim   and   belief   that   ideology   seeks   to   offer   credibility.37   At   this   stage   the   claim   to  
authority  is  not  yet  submitted  to  considerations  of  legitimacy.  Ricœur  is  here  concerned  with  the  
way  in  which  ideology  aids  in  establishing  any  sort  of  political  authority,  whether  legitimate  or  
illegitimate.  Much  of  Ricœur’s  treatment  of  Weber,  in  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia,  is  designed  
to  argue  that  Weber’s  is  a  motivational  model  of  authority,  in  that  it  emphasizes  social  practices  
aimed  at  encouraging  participation.  Thus,  Ricœur  is  not  directly  interested  in  explicating  details  
with  which  I  am  now  dealing.  But  he  does  elaborate  on  the  relationship  between  claim  and  belief  
as  they  appear  in  the  three  ideal  types  of  authority  treated  by  Weber.  Only  the  legal  type  and  the  
charismatic  type  get  due  treatment.  Ricœur  demonstrates  that  the  legal  type  is  “ideological  to  the  
extent  that  it  uses  formal  bureaucratic  efficiency  to  mask  the  real  nature  of  the  power  at  work,”38  
and  charismatic  authority  is  characterized  by  a  lack  of  reliance  on  belief,  “the  claim  does  not  rely  
on  the  belief,  but  the  belief  is  extorted  by  the  claim.”39  It  is  the  character  or  person  of  the  leader  
that  enforces  the  claim  to  authority.  Further,  it  is  in  the  charismatic  type  that  Ricœur  locates  the  
grounds   for   all   concerns   of   power   and   domination.40   Whatever   the   symbolic   elements,   and  
wherever  they  are  being  drawn  from  for  the  legitimation  of  authority,  Ricœur  wants  to  highlight  
that   the   process   of   legitimation,   the   claim   that   demands   belief   or   is   upheld   by   belief,   is  
ideologically  grounded.  There  is  an  ideological  aspect  to  legitimation  precisely  because  authority  
is  not  innate  to  human  social  existence.    
If  there  is  a  clue  to  the  way  in  which  ideology  actually  operates  in  legitimation  it  may  be  
in  the  idea  of  reification  that  Ricœur  briefly  mentions  at  the  end  of  the  second  chapter  on  Weber  
in  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia.  If  it  has  been  difficult  to  identify  the  specific  nature  of  ideology  
in  its   legitimating  function,  this   is  because  of  the  tendency  for  legitimating  processes  to  employ  
distorted   and   distorting   messages.   This   can   be   attested   to   by   the   absence   of   a   reference   to  
ideology  in  Weber’s  analysis,  a  fact  that  Ricœur  attributes  to  the  mistaken  view  that  ideology  is  
always  distorting.  But  it  is  through  ideology,  Ricœur  suggests  that  “our  relationships  are  frozen  
and  no  longer  appear  to  us  as  what  they  are;  there  is  a  reification  of  human  relationships.”41  Here  
it   is   the  claim  to  authority  and  the  ensuing  belief   in  that  claim  that   leads  to  the  actualization  of  
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relationships.   By   being   seen   as   static,   relationships,   including,   and   perhaps   primarily  
relationships   of   authority,   no   longer   display   the   dynamism   and   complexity   of   historical  
relationships.  The  reified  relationships  are  not  yet  distorted,  but  reveal  an  inchoate  break  with  the  
actual  course  of  things.  Thus  this  initial  break  with  reality  cannot  yet  be  aligned  with  the  active  
distortion  that  will  be  the  basis  of  political  evil.  
If  Ricœur  had  “The  Political  Paradox”  in  mind  when  delivering  his  lectures  on  ideology  
and   utopia   he   might   have   been   seeking   out   political   evil   in   the   emergence   of   violence   and  
coercion  from  the  initial  act  of  claiming  authority  as  detailed  in  his  discussion  of  Weber’s  concept  
of  Herrschaft.   But   this   is  not   to   say   that   every   claim   to   authority   is   inherently  violent,   or,  more  
accurately,   that  every  claim   to  authority   is   inherently  evil.  This  distinction   is  predicated  on   the  
distinction  that  Ricœur  makes,  albeit  with  an  uncharacteristic  lack  of  depth  in  analysis,  between  
legitimate   violence   and   political   evil,   characterized   by   political   alienation.   There   is   already  
political   alienation  with   the   extortion   of   belief   that   the   claim   to   authority   exercises.  One   could  
thus  conclude  that  the  legitimation  of  an  authority  does  violence  to  the  people  and  is  therefore  an  
expression  of  political  evil.  Given  that  Ricœur  follows  Weber’s  discussion  of  authority  through  to  
the   violence   of   domination   it  would   be   reasonable   to   see   the   end   of   politics   being   exactly   the  
power   that  Ricœur   reflects   on   in   “The  Political  Paradox.”  But   to   call   all   politics   evil,   as   such   a  
reading   implies,   is   to   ignore   the  degree   to  which  Ricœur   views  political   power   as   legitimately  
exercised,  even  when  violently  imposed.  
In   his   essay,   “State   and   Violence,”   Ricœur   introduces   the   idea   of   legitimate   violence,  
which  is  intimately  tied  to  the  political  nature  of  human  life.  He  writes,  “the  political  existence  of  
man   is   watched   over   and   guided   by   violence,   the   violence   of   the   State   which   has   the  
characteristics  of   legitimate  violence.”42  Two   things   in  particular  are  of  note   in   this   claim.  First,  
the   use   of   the   phrase,   “characteristics   of   legitimate   violence,”   intimates   the   possibility   that   the  
purported  violence  may  in  fact  be  illegitimate.  What  is  likely  is  that  Ricœur  is  equating  the  State  
with   the   exercise   of   a   certain   kind  of   power   that   finds   its  most   articulate   expression   in   certain  
kinds  of  violence.  But  the  question  of  legitimacy  remains,  and  it  is  this  question  that  in  fact  fuels  
the  paradox  expressed  in  the  tension  between  the  two  ethics  of  distress  outlined  in  the  conclusion  
to  that  essay.  The  paradox  is  the  juxtaposition  of  the  legality  and  therefore  justice  of  the  State  and  
the  rational   justification  of   the   individual   to  resist   the  State  on   issues  of  sanctioned  killing.  The  
paradox  in  that  essay  is  the  truth  of  both  the  preservation  of  the  State  and  treason.43  By  rejecting  
the   resolution  of   the  paradox  Ricœur   ensures   that   the  question  of   the   limits  of   legitimate  State  
violence  will  return  again  and  again  to  the  reflections  of  political  philosophy.    
A  second  thing  to  be  noted  in  Ricœur’s  claim  about  legitimate  violence  is  the  very  nature  
of   that  violence.  “In   its  most  elementary  and  at   the  same  time  most   indomitable   form,”  Ricœur  
writes,  “the  violence  of  the  State  is  the  violence  of  a  penal  character.”44  Here  the  most  basic  form  
of  State  violence,  violence  that  has  been  given  the  mark  of  legitimacy,  is  the  punitive  force  that  is  
exercised  in  response  to  the  violation  of   law.  The  option  of  the  death  penalty  means  that   in  the  
State   the   law   of   love,   which   Ricœur   here   equates   with   the   commandment   not   to   kill,   is  
repudiated.  Thus,  while  Ricœur  identifies  the  limit  to  violence  in  the  commandment  not  to  kill,45  
the   ethics   of   distress   is   predicated   on   the   very   fact   of   this   limit’s   violation.   This   violation   is  
brought  into  sharper  relief  with  the  exigencies  of  war.    
The  discussion  of  violence  that  Ricœur  presents  in  “State  and  Violence”  does  not  yet  get  
at  the  nature  of  the  violence  that  is  expressed  in  the  political  evil  of  the  political  paradox.  If  the  
most   basic   violence   is   penal   violence,   then   to  what   does   penal   violence   refer?   Is   violence   that  
precedes   penal   violence   considered   “violence”?   Certainly   Ricœur   refers   to   the   motivation   to  
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adhere   to  prescribed  actions   as   falling  under   the   sway  of   enforcement  powers,   suggesting   that  
penal  violence,   or   at   least   the   threat   of  penal  violence   is   already  operative   at   the   level   of   basic  
laws.46  But  the  claim  to  authority  and  the  granting  of  that  authority  occurs  even  before  the  most  
basic  sanctioning  of  behavior  by  an  authority,  suggesting  that  the  legitimation  of  authority  can,  at  
least  by  some  measure,  be  considered  prior  to  the  violence  being  considered.  
The  challenges  of  a  concept  of  legitimate  violence  only  delay  the  naming  of  political  evil.  
If   the  violence  of   the  State   is   legitimate,   at   least   insofar   as   its   actions  are   sanctioned  by   law,   at  
what  point  does  the  predication  of  political  evil  apply  to  the  State?  A  hint  towards  an  answer  to  
this  question  can  be  found  exactly  in  the  functions  of  ideology.  I  submit  that  the  transition  from  
legitimate  violence  to  political  evil  occurs,  sometimes  at  the  level  of  legitimation  and  sometimes  
at  the  level  of  distortion.  As  was  shown,  ideology  as  legitimation  fills  the  gap  between  the  claim  
to   authority   and   the   belief   in   that   authority.   But   the   surplus-­‐‑value   to   which   ideology   here  
responds   does   not   automatically   signal  manipulation   or   coercion,   in   short,   authority   does   not  
signal  illegitimacy  by  necessity.  Bruce  Lincoln’s  analysis  of  authority  is  useful  here  because,  like  
Ricœur,  it  focuses  on  a  claim  to  authority,  but  then  introduces  an  important  distinction  between  
legitimacy   and   illegitimacy   that   is   largely   absent   from   Ricœur’s   works.   Lincoln   describes  
authority  as  “(1)  an  effect;  (2)  the  capacity  for  producing  that  effect;  and  (3)  the  commonly  shared  
opinion  that  a  given  actor  has  the  capacity  for  producing  that  effect.”47  What  exactly  the  effect  is  
appears  differently   in  different  contexts,   some  of  which  Lincoln   treats   throughout   the   text.  The  
claim  to  authority  is  the  claim  of  (2),  the  claim  that  one  is  able  to  bring  about  that  for  which  one  is  
making   the   claim.  The  belief   in   authority   lies   in   the   shared  opinion  described  above.  Lincoln’s  
work   traverses   different   expressions   of   this   relationship.   Importantly   for   current   purposes,   he  
rejects  the  idea  that  manipulation  and  coercion  are  operative  in  authority  proper.    
Unlike   Weber,   Lincoln   rejects   the   possibility   that   force   and   physical   violence   can   be  
aspects   of   authority.   “And  when   authority   operates   (and   is   seen   to   operate)   on   pain   and   fear  
rather  than  on  trust  and  respect,  it  ceases  to  be  authority  and  becomes  (an  attempt  at)  coercion.”48  
It  is  in  this  distinction  that  I  see  an  incredibly  helpful  way  of  distinguishing,  in  Ricœur,  between  
the  legitimacy  of  violence  for  political  purposes  and  political  evil.  In  fact,  Ricœur,  in  his  treatment  
of  Weber’s  discussion  of  order,  power,  and  domination,  has  gone  a  long  way  towards  accepting  
such  a  distinction,  without  actually  articulating  it.  Ricœur  refers  to  a  pessimistic  definition  of  the  
State   in  which  Weber   highlights   the   “claim   to   the  monopoly   of   the   legitimate   use   of   physical  
force  in  the  enforcement  of  its  order.”49  Though  it  is  the  threat  of  force  that  distinguishes  the  State  
from  other  forms  of  organizations,  it  is  in  the  idea  of  the  enforcement  of  order  that  I  take  Ricœur’s  
conception  of  the  State  to  be  most  well-­‐‑formed.  While  tensions  deriving  from  internal  conflicts  of  
identity  give  to  politics  an  internal  instability,  the  political  sphere  is  established  on  the  basis  of  a  
certain  order  that  is  representative  of  the  values  shared  by  those  agreeing  to  the  social  contract.  
The   establishment   of   an   authority,   the   distinguishing   of   a   sovereign   from   the   body   sovereign,  
comes  from  the  belief  that  that  order  requires  protection,  whether  it  is  protection  from  within  or  
protection  from  without.  If  this  can  reasonably  be  deemed  to  be  the  case,  then  the  enforcement  of  
order   does   not   yet   necessitate   physical   coercion,   or   the   threat   of   coercion,   embodied   in   the  
legitimate  force  of  Weber’s  State.  Indeed,  the  protection  or  preservation  of  an  order  begins  with  
the   codification   of   the   order.   This   codification   amounts   to   the   initial   stages   of   its   enforcement.  
This  does  not  at  all  mean  that  the  stage  of  the  threat  of  physical  force  can  be  avoided  or  that  it  is  
ultimately  beneficial  to  avoid  it.  Rather,  by  placing  the  State  prior  to  the  deployment  of  physical  
force  or  coercion,  Ricœur  can  conceptualize  the  State  more  positively.  Recall  that  the  organization  
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society  under  this  symbolism  is  the  institution.  But  institutions  are  exactly  representative  of  both  
shared  values  and  constraint.  Institutions  can  thus  operate  in  this  space  between  integration  and  
distortion,  representing  as  they  do  the  preservation  of  order  through  non-­‐‑coercive  enforcement.  
Thus,   even   following   the   rules   on   the   basis   of   it   not   being   good   to   be   punished   does   not  
necessarily  represent  ideology  as  distorting  and  so,  is  not  the  mark  of  political  evil.  
Given  that  the  central  text  for  this  analysis  has  been  Lectures  on  Ideology  and  Utopia,   it   is  
reasonable   to   ask,   where   is   utopia   in   all   of   this?   Utopia   remains   as   a   protective   critique   of  
ideology.  At   the   level   of   legitimation   utopias   unmask   the   overvaluation   provided   by   ideology  
and  thus  force  authority  to  work  in  the  light.  “In  other  words,”  Ricœur  suggests,  “utopias  always  
imply  alternative  ways  of  using  power,  whether   in   family,  political,   economic,  or   religious   life,  
and   in   that   way   they   call   established   systems   of   power   into   question.”50   This   is   an   important  
caution   against   the   too   quick   and   too   full   acceptance   of   integrating   and   legitimating   ideology.  
The   threat   of   distorted   reality   is   an   ever   present   threat,   and  with   it   the   threat   of   political   evil.  
Viewing   ideology  as   formative  and  even  positive   in  communities  enhances   the  need  for  checks  
and   balances.   Utopia   can   provide   correction   and   hope,   it   can   positively   impact   its   target  
community  insofar  as  it  effectively  critiques  and  grounds  the  community  in  a  reality  with  hope.  
Here  lies  the  positive  function  of  utopia—it  has  the  capacity  to  present  the  social  imaginary  in  full  
force.   It   is   in   this   way   that   utopia   is   more   than   just   a   critique.   Like   ideology,   utopia   can   be  
integrating.   Utopia   “as   the   function   of   the   nowhere   in   the   constitution   of   social   or   symbolic  
action,   is   the   counterpart   of   our   first   concept   of   ideology   (integration).   There   is   no   social  
integration  without   social   subversion,  we  may  say.  The   reflexivity  of   the  process  of   integration  
occurs  by  means  of  the  process  of  subversion.”51  Ideology  as  integration  cannot  operate  without  
the   imaginative   force   of   utopia.   The   pre-­‐‑political   person   cannot   imagine   the   benefits   of   polity  
without   this   view   from   “nowhere.”   In   this   way   utopia   has   the   potential   for   furnishing   the  
possibilities  of  human  social  existence.  
Conclusion  
“The   effort,”  Ricœur   suggests  of  his   study  of   ideology  and  utopia,   “is   to   recognize   the  
claim   of   a   concept   which   is   at   first   sight  merely   a   polemical   tool.”52   Since   ideology   is   always  
something  that  someone  else  has,  something  that  guides  the  thought  and  actions  of  another,  an  
awareness  of   the  depth  of  meaning  beyond   the  distorted   surface  of   an   ideology  can  contribute  
positively  to  the  mutual  recognition  that  is  at  the  heart  of  Ricœur’s  conception  of  justice.  Ricœur’s  
work  on  ideology  demonstrates  that  it   is  not  merely  the  “other”  that  holds  an  ideology.  Rather,  
the  integrative  aspect  of  ideology  means  that  there  is  an  ideological  element  to  every  community,  
especially   those   that   are   politically   organized.   This   is   because   social   existence   is   mediated  
symbolically.  Though  ideologies  may  seem  threatening,  because  they  “are  gaps  or  discordances  
in   relation   to   the   real   course   of   things…the   death   of   ideologies   would   be   the   most   sterile   of  
lucidities;   for   a   social   group  without   ideology   and  utopia  would   be  without   a   plan,  without   a  
distance  from  itself,  without  a  self-­‐‑representation.”53  Ideology,  alongside  utopia,  in  an  important  
way,  furnishes  a  community  with  a  past  and  a  future.  Together  they  are,  as  Ricœur  would  say,  
mutually  constitutive  of  a  community.    
Of   course,   ideology   is   much  more   than   this.   The   downside   of   ideology   is   a   very   real  
danger   to  a   community  and   to   individuals   in   that   community.  With   ideology   in  all   its   fullness  
comes   the   threat   of   political   evil;   this   is   the   political   paradox.   An   awareness   of   the   depths   of  
meaning   of   ideology,   the  depths   of   its   role   in   the   formation   and  maintenance   of   a   community  
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appear  to  go  a  long  way  in  mitigating  the  threat  of  political  evil.  That  is  to  say,  by  looking  past  
ideology  as  distortion,  by  seeing  it  present  in  the  legitimation  of  systems  of  authority  and  also  at  
the  very  heart  of  the  identity  of  a  political  community  it  is  possible  to  see  another’s  ideology  as  so  
much  more  than  a  negative  force.  This  realization  gestures  towards  recognition  of  others  for  who  
they   are,   theoretically   opening   up   the   possibility   of   discussion   rather   than   aggression.   Social  
imagination  in  general,  and  ideology  in  particular,  thus  becomes  a  tool  for  the  mitigation  of  the  
possibility   of   political   evil   because   it   works   towards   political   integration   rather   than   mere  
alienation.  To  see  politics  as  only  evil  would  be  to  miss  this  important  opportunity  for  enhancing  
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